Thursday, November 02, 2006

Locke: Proof for the Existence of the External World

Locke offers a series of rhetorical arguments for the acceptance of the existence of the external world. Here is a brief summary of them.

1. Locke agrees with Berkeley about the fact that the only proof of the external world is the ideas caused by our sensations, and there is no necessary connection between the existence of an idea and the existence of its cause. Neither philosophers think Cartesian certainty about a world of mind-independent objects is possible.

Locke still believes that there is a world external to our ideas, however. The first thing he suggests we do is "lower the bar" for what we call knowledge. The ideas caused by our sensations are the best evidence we have of "the existence of things without us," and he claims that this deserves to be called knowledge. But this is certainly not what Descartes wanted to call knowledge.

2. The Performative Argument: Locke says that anyone who is skeptical of the external world, who thinks that she is dreaming, would not bother to disagree with him. He says that anyone who is so skeptical to doubt their sensations "will never have any controversy with me, since he can never be sure I say anything contrary to his opinion. And later, "if all be a dream, then he doth but dream that he makes the question, and so it is not much matter that a waking man should answer him." If skeptic really believed his own arguments, he would not reply to Locke since Locke is part of the external world that he thinks is dubious. This is a bit of cheap shot on Descartes. Descartes' doubt is part of a method he came up with in order to attain certainty. It was part of a thought experiment. He never said that he believed he was dreaming or being deceived by an evil demon, he just supposed that it was possible.

3. Where else would our ideas come from? Our sense-organs do not magically generate ideas all by themselves. Nobody gets the relish of a pineapple until they travel to the West Indies and eat one.

This argument by itself is not very compelling, but it is part of a larger abductive argument (an argument to the best explanation).

4. Our ideas are caused independently of our willing: If I look at the sun, I cannot keep myself from having ideas which it causes in me. If we had control over our ideas, what would keep us from only producing pleasurable ones in our minds? We suffer great pains, and if there were no exterior cause, these painful ideas in our minds would either never or always bother us.

5. Corroboration of the senses: One sense sometimes verifies are falsifies ideas given from our other senses. For example, we can figure out that a stick in water isn't actually bent by pulling it out.

6. Pragmatic appeal: Our senses are good enough for keeping us alive. They serve our purposes well enough. Later on, Locke says that anyone who in his ordinary affairs takes up Cartesian skepticism would be sure of nothing more than dying quickly.

If our Cartesian dreamer should doubt their veracity, why doesn't he just go stick his head in an oven? This is a fallacious appeal to force. There's a cool website that lists fallacies here: http://www.fallacyfiles.org/adbacula.html This is what they had to say about this fallacy:

Appeal to Force is a technique of distraction which occurs when force, or the threat of force, is used to "win" a debate. More frequently, it is used to cover up the fact that the threatener is losing. The name "argumentum ad baculum" alludes to the use of a stick, or club, to beat someone. This fallacy is committed whenever force or the threat of it is introduced into a rational discussion in order to derail it. It is a fallacy simply because force is not an argument.

Locke concludes by saying that all he has been arguing for is the probable existence of the external world, at least when we are not perceiving it. He concludes that though it is very likely that there exists an external world that continues to exist when we are not perceiving it, he cannot really say that this probablity constitutes knowledge. (See the end of par. 9, he takes of all the people in the world, and that when he is alone, he cannot really be sure of anything more than his perceptions, and even then, how sure can he really be if the only evidence he has for trusting them is that they are useful for staying alive?)

0 Comments:

Post a Comment

<< Home