If a tree falls in the forest, and nobody hears it, does it make a sound?
Berkeley says no.
Berkeley is not persuaded by Locke's arguments for believing in the external world. But he does not think that not believing in the existence of a world of mind-independent objects is anything to get excited about. All that Berkeley is willing to admit into his ontology are ideas and the minds that perceive them. Here is his argument:
(1) We perceive ordinary objects (houses, mountains, etc.).
Berkely argues that there are no good reasons to accept Locke's claim that our ideas our representations of objects. Here is his counterpunch:
"But say you, though the ideas themselves do not exist without the mind, yet there may be things like them whereof they are copies or resemblances, which things exist without the mind, in an unthinking substance. I answer, an idea can be like nothing but an idea; a colour or figure can be like nothing but another colour or figure" (par. 8).
We cannot step out of our own skin and objectively compare our ideas with the objects that they supposedly represent. So we have no solid ground upon which to assume that they do so.
If an idea can only be like another idea, then what can we say of the existence of a world of mind-independent objects? His answer is, nothing, because he says no other way to describe material objects except in terms of our ideas.
As for Locke's distinction between primary and secondary qualities, Berkeley attacks it as unintelligible. His argument is part of a larger argument against the possibility of abstraction. He does not think we can conceive of an object's primary qualities by abstracting away all of the secondary qualities (everything about the object that depends on our senses: taste, see, sound, feel, smell). He says that primary qualities cannot be conceived in absence of some secondary qualities. In paragraph 10 he asks if any of his objectors could conceive of a triangle without colour, or any other sensible qualities.
Berkeley thinks that the craziest abstract idea of them all is material substance. He says that material substance is a vague and indeterminate notion, with no other meaning than the idea of being in general. Material substance is supposed to support all of the mind dependent qualities that we perceive; it is some indeterminate substratum that makes our ideas possible but which we can never have an idea of.
He says that the notion of material substance is incomprehensible and contrary to commonsense. It depends on the possibility of objects existing independently of our perceiving them, and Berkeley says that is a manifest contradiction because to be an object is simply to be a bundle of ideas.
The Master Argument: Berkeley is willing to rest everything he says on this (par. 22-23).
… I am content to put the whole upon this issue; if you can but conceive it possible for one extended moveable substance, or in general, for any one idea or any thing like an idea, to exist otherwise than in a mind perceiving it, I shall readily give up the cause…. But say you, surely there is nothing easier than to imagine trees, for instance, in a park, or books existing in a closet, and no body by to perceive them. I answer, you may so, there is no difficulty in it: but what is all this, I beseech you, more than framing in your mind certain ideas which you call books and trees, and at the same time omitting to frame the idea of any one that may perceive them? But do not you your self perceive or think of them all the while? This therefore is nothing to the purpose: it only shows you have the power of imagining or forming ideas in your mind; but it doth not shew that you can conceive it possible, the objects of your thought may exist without the mind: to make out this, it is necessary that you conceive them existing unconceived or unthought of, which is a manifest repugnancy. When we do our utmost to conceive the existence of external bodies, we are all the while only contemplating our own ideas. But the mind taking no notice of itself, is deluded to think it can and doth conceive bodies existing unthought of or without the mind; though at the same time they are apprehended by or exist in it self. (PHK 22-23)
Any objections?
Berkeley says no.
Berkeley is not persuaded by Locke's arguments for believing in the external world. But he does not think that not believing in the existence of a world of mind-independent objects is anything to get excited about. All that Berkeley is willing to admit into his ontology are ideas and the minds that perceive them. Here is his argument:
(1) We perceive ordinary objects (houses, mountains, etc.).
(2) We perceive only ideas of those objects.
Therefore,
(3) Ordinary objects are ideas.
This is a valid argument, but Locke has a response to it. Locke would block Berkeley's conclusion by distinguishing between two sorts of perception. He would say (1') We mediately perceive objects and (2') We immediately perceive our ideas. Of course, Berkeley knows this and he has a response.Berkely argues that there are no good reasons to accept Locke's claim that our ideas our representations of objects. Here is his counterpunch:
"But say you, though the ideas themselves do not exist without the mind, yet there may be things like them whereof they are copies or resemblances, which things exist without the mind, in an unthinking substance. I answer, an idea can be like nothing but an idea; a colour or figure can be like nothing but another colour or figure" (par. 8).
We cannot step out of our own skin and objectively compare our ideas with the objects that they supposedly represent. So we have no solid ground upon which to assume that they do so.
If an idea can only be like another idea, then what can we say of the existence of a world of mind-independent objects? His answer is, nothing, because he says no other way to describe material objects except in terms of our ideas.
As for Locke's distinction between primary and secondary qualities, Berkeley attacks it as unintelligible. His argument is part of a larger argument against the possibility of abstraction. He does not think we can conceive of an object's primary qualities by abstracting away all of the secondary qualities (everything about the object that depends on our senses: taste, see, sound, feel, smell). He says that primary qualities cannot be conceived in absence of some secondary qualities. In paragraph 10 he asks if any of his objectors could conceive of a triangle without colour, or any other sensible qualities.
Berkeley thinks that the craziest abstract idea of them all is material substance. He says that material substance is a vague and indeterminate notion, with no other meaning than the idea of being in general. Material substance is supposed to support all of the mind dependent qualities that we perceive; it is some indeterminate substratum that makes our ideas possible but which we can never have an idea of.
He says that the notion of material substance is incomprehensible and contrary to commonsense. It depends on the possibility of objects existing independently of our perceiving them, and Berkeley says that is a manifest contradiction because to be an object is simply to be a bundle of ideas.
The Master Argument: Berkeley is willing to rest everything he says on this (par. 22-23).
… I am content to put the whole upon this issue; if you can but conceive it possible for one extended moveable substance, or in general, for any one idea or any thing like an idea, to exist otherwise than in a mind perceiving it, I shall readily give up the cause…. But say you, surely there is nothing easier than to imagine trees, for instance, in a park, or books existing in a closet, and no body by to perceive them. I answer, you may so, there is no difficulty in it: but what is all this, I beseech you, more than framing in your mind certain ideas which you call books and trees, and at the same time omitting to frame the idea of any one that may perceive them? But do not you your self perceive or think of them all the while? This therefore is nothing to the purpose: it only shows you have the power of imagining or forming ideas in your mind; but it doth not shew that you can conceive it possible, the objects of your thought may exist without the mind: to make out this, it is necessary that you conceive them existing unconceived or unthought of, which is a manifest repugnancy. When we do our utmost to conceive the existence of external bodies, we are all the while only contemplating our own ideas. But the mind taking no notice of itself, is deluded to think it can and doth conceive bodies existing unthought of or without the mind; though at the same time they are apprehended by or exist in it self. (PHK 22-23)
Any objections?
posted by Alden at 10:36 PM
1 Comments:
The argument seems intended to establish that we cannot actually conceive of mind-independent objects, that is, objects existing unperceived and unthought of. Why not? Simply because in order to conceive of any such things, we must ourselves be conceiving, i.e., thinking, of them. However, as Pitcher (1977, 113) nicely observes, such an argument seems to conflate the representation (what we conceive with) and the represented (what we conceive of—the content of our thought). Once we make this distinction, we realize that although we must have some conception or representation in order to conceive of something, and that representation is in some sense thought of, it does not follow (contra Berkeley) that what we conceive of must be a thought-of object. That is, when we imagine a tree standing alone in a forest, we (arguably) conceive of an unthought-of object, though of course we must employ a thought in order to accomplish this feat.[6] Thus (as many commentators have observed), this argument fails. (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/berkeley/#2.2.1)
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