The Zombie Argument
It seemed like there was some interest in zombies, so here is a rough and ready version of the zombie argument.
The rough idea is that it I can conceive a molecule-for-molecule physical duplicate of myself that is identical to me not only in its material constitution but also in its behavior and reactions to various stimuli. The only thing that separates Alden from zombie-Alden is a full-night’s sleep, or, to be serious, phenomenal consciousness or qualia. There is nothing that it is like to be zombie-Alden. To make it more perspicuous, here is a formalization of Chalmers’ argument. It is important to note that it’s not necessary that there be a full-blown zombie-Alden; a partial zombie or someone with inverted qualia serves the argument just as well. Let P be the conjunction of all microphysical truths about the universe and Q be a phenomenal truth, either that someone is phenomenally conscious or that someone instantiates a particular phenomenal property.
(1) P&~Q is conceivable
(2) If P&~Q is conceivable, P&~Q is metaphysically possible
(3) If P&~Q is metaphysically possible, materialism is false.
________
(4) Materialism is false (Chalmers, 2005).
Here is an excerpt of someone else explaining the same point, perhaps more clearly.
"The materialist claims that there is an identity between brain states and mental states. Or to put it another way: mental states are nothing other than brain states.
Let's make believe that brain science shows us that the conscious experience of pain is correlated with c-fiber firing. (It doesn't show that, but let's make believe.) What that means is that, whenever my c-fibers fire, I experience pain, and whenever I experience pain, my c-fibers are firing.
Now correlation is different from identity. Let's say that I have a marionette, and whenever I pull the string, its arm raises, and whenever its arm raises, it's because I pulled the string. (Imagine that nothing else, like another person or the wind, could intervene to make the marionette's arm raise except my pulling the string.) This is a case of correlation without identity, because my hand is not identical to the raising of the marionette's arm. They're two separate things, but one causes the other.
The materialist is claiming that there is correlation and identity between brain states and mental states. He's saying that they're equivalent, in the same way that, for example, heat and molecular motion are equivalent. (Make sure you distinguish in your mind heat from the sensation of heat. That's important.) In the same way that it's impossible that heat could be anything other than molecular motion (and vice versa), it is likewise impossible that pain could be anything other than c-fiber firing (and vice versa).
Are you following me so far? The materialist I'm talking about is saying that brain states and mental states are identical. So brain states = x and mental states = x, so brain states = mental states. It's a physical relationship, but it's also a logical relationship. What that means is that, in any possible universe, these two things are the same thing. This is because identity is special. You can't have contingent identity, only necessary identity. This is crucial. Saying "brain states = mental states" is just like saying "A = A." Just like it's never true that A = ~A, so it is never true that brain states = ~(mental states). Got it?
Now here's the counterargument, known as the "Conceivability Argument." It's not exactly the same thing as the Zombie Argument, but it takes the same form, and I think it's easier to understand. It goes like this:
It seemed like there was some interest in zombies, so here is a rough and ready version of the zombie argument.
The rough idea is that it I can conceive a molecule-for-molecule physical duplicate of myself that is identical to me not only in its material constitution but also in its behavior and reactions to various stimuli. The only thing that separates Alden from zombie-Alden is a full-night’s sleep, or, to be serious, phenomenal consciousness or qualia. There is nothing that it is like to be zombie-Alden. To make it more perspicuous, here is a formalization of Chalmers’ argument. It is important to note that it’s not necessary that there be a full-blown zombie-Alden; a partial zombie or someone with inverted qualia serves the argument just as well. Let P be the conjunction of all microphysical truths about the universe and Q be a phenomenal truth, either that someone is phenomenally conscious or that someone instantiates a particular phenomenal property.
(1) P&~Q is conceivable
(2) If P&~Q is conceivable, P&~Q is metaphysically possible
(3) If P&~Q is metaphysically possible, materialism is false.
________
(4) Materialism is false (Chalmers, 2005).
Here is an excerpt of someone else explaining the same point, perhaps more clearly.
"The materialist claims that there is an identity between brain states and mental states. Or to put it another way: mental states are nothing other than brain states.
Let's make believe that brain science shows us that the conscious experience of pain is correlated with c-fiber firing. (It doesn't show that, but let's make believe.) What that means is that, whenever my c-fibers fire, I experience pain, and whenever I experience pain, my c-fibers are firing.
Now correlation is different from identity. Let's say that I have a marionette, and whenever I pull the string, its arm raises, and whenever its arm raises, it's because I pulled the string. (Imagine that nothing else, like another person or the wind, could intervene to make the marionette's arm raise except my pulling the string.) This is a case of correlation without identity, because my hand is not identical to the raising of the marionette's arm. They're two separate things, but one causes the other.
The materialist is claiming that there is correlation and identity between brain states and mental states. He's saying that they're equivalent, in the same way that, for example, heat and molecular motion are equivalent. (Make sure you distinguish in your mind heat from the sensation of heat. That's important.) In the same way that it's impossible that heat could be anything other than molecular motion (and vice versa), it is likewise impossible that pain could be anything other than c-fiber firing (and vice versa).
Are you following me so far? The materialist I'm talking about is saying that brain states and mental states are identical. So brain states = x and mental states = x, so brain states = mental states. It's a physical relationship, but it's also a logical relationship. What that means is that, in any possible universe, these two things are the same thing. This is because identity is special. You can't have contingent identity, only necessary identity. This is crucial. Saying "brain states = mental states" is just like saying "A = A." Just like it's never true that A = ~A, so it is never true that brain states = ~(mental states). Got it?
Now here's the counterargument, known as the "Conceivability Argument." It's not exactly the same thing as the Zombie Argument, but it takes the same form, and I think it's easier to understand. It goes like this:
- It is conceivable that c-fibers fire without pain taking place. (Imagine, for example, a zombie!)
- From (1), it is logically possible that there could be c-fibers firing without pain.
- Therefore, c-fibers firing is not identical with pain.
posted by Alden at 6:17 PM
2 Comments:
The materialist claims that there is an identity between brain states and mental states. Or to put it another way: mental states are nothing other than brain states.
does this say that brain states are physical states? are brain states and physical states are the same thing? If they say that mental states are nothing more than brain states doesn't that deny consciencousness? Like the example of the consciencous want of the beer, which connects our mental to our physical states. hm maybe i just don't understand as im behind on my reading.
ktuvic,
Perhaps you are confused by the wording. Mental states=states of the mind=consciousness. Brain state=physical states.
So the materialist is saying that brain states are mental states. Capice?
The identity theorist is saying that our conscious states are identical with brain states, so she is not denying consciousness but saying that consciousness can be explained in purely physical terms. This is what Chalmers and Jackson deny.
Other philosophers deny that our conscious experience is important to understanding the nature of the mind. Churchland and Daniel Dennett hold this position. They argue that qualia do not exist, or at least that their existence is significant enough for science to care about.
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